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Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) was a Catholic priest and held, until his politically motivated 
dismissal by the Austrian Emperor Franz in 1819/20, a professorship on religious doctrine at 
the University of Prague. He was a polymath, writing on philosophy of religion, political 
philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, and social reform (and engaged in philanthropic work). Yet his 
most notable and original work, largely ignored during his life, is on mathematics, logic, and 
philosophy of science. This part of Bolzano’s work was influential upon many students of 
Franz Brentano (Smith 1994:156), e.g., Carl Stumpf, Alexius Meinong, Kazimierz 
Twardowski, and not least Edmund Husserl: “Bernard Bolzano’s Wissenshaftslehre [...]far 
surpasses everything the world-literature has to offer in the way of a systematic sketch of 
logic. [...]we must count him as one of the greatest logicians of all time” (Prolegomena, 
appendix to §61, Husserl 2001:142). Bolzano’s notion of ‘proposition in itself’ (Sätze an 
sich) is a predecessor of Brentano’s ‘immanent content’, Frege’s ‘thought’ (Gedanke), and 
Husserl’s ‘ideal meaning’; and more generally, Bolzano’s view that propositions are, in 
Husserl’s terminology, ideal or abstract entities was highly influential (Smith 1994:185-190). 
There has recently been a vast expansion in the literature on Bolzano’s theoretical 
philosophy. In 2014 the first complete English translation of Bolzano’s main work from 
1837, the Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science), was published in four volumes (Bolzano 
2014). Some noteworthy recent monographs are Morscher’s (2008) Bolzano’s Life and Work 
and Lapointe’s (2011) Bolzano’s Theoretical Philosophy. For a brief introduction see 
Morscher (2014) and Šebestik (2016). What is of interest for the purpose of this review is the 
fact that Bolzano was, as claimed by Roski, perhaps the first to have a proper, though 
tentative and fragmentary, theory of grounding (55; here and henceforth references to page 
numbers alone refer to the book here under review). 
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Grounding is a topic which has received immense attention these last 15 years or so 
(see Correia & Schnieder 2012; Bliss & Trogdon 2016). It is often seen as a replacement for 
the controversial notions of truth-makers and of supervenience, where it is taken as a virtue of 
all these notions that they allow for non-eliminative theories, for instance of the mental or of 
social reality. Still, grounding is perhaps an even more controversial notion. For instance, the 
notion is criticized for being too coarse-grained (Wilson 2014). Some examples of grounding, 
especially conducive to Bolzano’s conception, are (216): 
*Moral facts obtain because non-moral ones do. E.g., Metternich’s actions are bad because 
they yield to a decrease of the overall distribution of happiness. 
*It is true that p because p. E.g., it is true that Socrates is brave because Socrates is brave. 
*A conjunction is true because its conjuncts are true. E.g., Socrates is Greek and Socrates is a 
philosopher because Socrates is Greek, and because Socrates is a philosopher. 
The use of ‘because’ indicates that a relation of grounding holds between two true 
propositions (the relata). ‘Because’ is here not used in an evidential and epistemological 
sense; rather, but rather to express an explanatory metaphysical priority-relation. 
Roski’s Bolzano’s Conception of Grounding is the first book-length treatment solely 
devoted to Bolzano’s theory of grounding. The author is concerned with Bolzano’s mature 
theory of grounding as expressed in his main work, the Wissenschaftslehre (especially WL 
§198-221). Aside from a few notes, the book does not discuss Bolzano’s transition from his 
immature to his mature theory (especially, both from 1810, the Aetiologie and the Beyträge 
zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik; but cf. Centrone 2016). Nor does it 
discuss Bolzano’s influence on his successors, e.g., Husserl. By all meanings of the term, this 
is a scholarly work—both in its varied use of texts from Bolzano’s collected works (the 
Bernard Bolzano Gesamtausgabe), and in its discussion of relevant secondary literature. As I 
am no scholar of Bolzano, I will not engage with Roski’s interpretation. Rather, I will focus 
on the value of this book for a general reader, who is either already familiar with the recent 
grounding-literature and interested in learning more on Bolzano’s view, or interested in a 
historically guided introduction to grounding. 
The book is a revision of Roski’s 2013 doctoral dissertation, from which two chapters 
have been omitted (one on Bolzano’s early work and one on his conception of science) and 
one chapter added (ch.5). It consists of an introduction (ch.1); a presentation of key notions 
from the Wissenschaftslehre, especially deducibility (ch.2); one chapter on Bolzano’s pure 
logic of grounding (ch.3), and a very long chapter on his impure logic of grounding (ch.4). 
Roski takes the distinction between pure and impure from Fine (2012). The pure logic of 
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grounding “contains principles that hold for every case of grounding, irrespective of [...]the 
relata”, whereas impure logic of grounding “consists of more specific principles that mostly 
apply only to truths from deductive or a priori sciences” (16). The book concludes with a 
comparison between Bolzano’s theory and contemporary theories of grounding (ch.5). 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
The introduction not only contains the customary brief description and motivation of the 
book, methodological remarks, and outline of the chapters. It further gives a brief description 
of grounding. Bolzano’s terminology is that of a relation of grounding (Abfolge) which holds 
between two relata (both truths), the ground (Grund) and the consequence (Folge). 
Unfortunately, the translation of ‘Abfolge’ as ‘grounding’ is nowhere defended in the book; in 
Bolzano (2014) it is translated as ‘the relation of ground and consequence’, and ‘grounding’ 
might be a misleading translation. Roski characterizes grounding as an explanatory 
consequence relation—thus, the consequence not only follows deductively (Roski explains 
this notion in ch.2, see below) from the ground(s), but the ground is also explanatory of the 
consequence (2). Further, grounding is an ordering relation and is as such asymmetric: a 
grounds b, yet b does not ground a. Roski presents two of Bolzano’s examples of grounding 
(for both these examples, though presumably not in general, either proposition is deducible 
from the other): First, the truth that the atmospheric pressure has dropped partially grounds 
the truth that the barometer stands lower. Second, from Euclid’s Elements (Prop I.1), the truth 
that for every two points a and b, there is a point c such that lines ab = ac = bc grounds the 
truth that the circumferences of any two circles with common radius ab and centres a, b, 
lying on the same plane, intersect at a point c equidistant from a and b. 
Historically, Roski situates Bolzano within what he names, following Betti & de Jong 
(2010), the Classical Model of Science. This model goes back to Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics, and Roski says that similar views are defended inter alia by Arnauld & Nicole’s 
Port Royal Logic, Leibniz, and Wolff. Its central idea is that science should be structured 
axiomatically (e.g., Euclid’s axiomatization of geometry). Earlier discussions of this model 
simply call it the Ancient Axiomatic Theory (Scholz 1930/1975). This accords with the 
traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (dating back at least to 
Philoponus’ 6th century commentary), although it is by no means the only possibility (for an 
interpretation more along the line of a Husserlian formal ontology, where each science is a 
regional ontology, see my (2016)). In the remainder of the book Euclid, not Aristotle, will 
represent this model (although Bolzano considered Euclid’s Elements to be highly flawed). 
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Roski notes strong similarities between Bolzano’s two examples (especially the 
barometer) and Aristotle’s example that “it is not because the planets [C] do not twinkle [B] 
that they are near [A] – rather, because they are near they do not twinkle.” (APo I 13, 78a37-
38) For one, we have a similar use of ‘because’. Further, Aristotle says that either truth 
deductively follows from the other: ‘B belongs to C, and A belongs to B, therefore A belongs 
to C’ is a valid syllogism, but it gives the wrong explanation (aitia). The correct explanation 
has A (being near) as the explanatory middle term: ‘A belongs to C, B belongs to A, therefore 
B belongs to C.’ This illustrates Aristotle’s distinction between a merely valid and a 
demonstrative (explanatory) syllogism (a modern variant is Bromberger’s flagpole-
counterexample to the Hempel-Oppenheim-account). Similarly, Bolzano speaks of 
demonstrations (Begründungen) which present the objective ground for a truth (10-11). A 
further similarity, unremarked by Roski, is Bolzano’s distinction between objective and 
subjective grounds, where the latter corresponds to the evidential/epistemological use of 
‘because’. Thus, while the fall in atmospheric pressure is the objective ground of the fall of 
the barometer, conversely the fall of the barometer is the subjective ground of the fall in 
atmospheric pressure. This is the same as Aristotle’s distinction between what is prior to us 
and what is prior in nature/simpliciter (APo I 2, 72
b
25-32). Third, Roski does not mention the 
strong similarity between Aristotle’s view throughout the Posterior Analytics and Bolzano’s 
view that the “generality of the premises is thus, as it were, measured in terms of the terminus 
medius. [...]the highest possible generality is given by the case in which terminus medius and 
predicate idea have the same extension.” (179) 
Finally, Roski presents six claims central to Bolzano’s conception of grounding (12): 
(I) Grounding proceeds from more to less general truths. 
(II) Grounding proceeds from simple to more complex truths. (Roski argues in ch.4 that 
Bolzano came to reject this claim). 
(III) The grounds of a given consequence are uniquely determined. 
(IV) There are ungrounded truths. 
(V) Grounding is an asymmetric relation. 
(VI) Grounding gives rise to deductive economy. 
 
Chapter 2. Objective truth, variation & truth-preservation 
Roski presents some key notions from Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre, which are prerequisites 
for understanding Bolzano’s theory of grounding. 
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For Bolzano, the relata of grounding are true propositions (Sätze an sich). 
Propositions are abstract objects (Bolzano merely speaks of non-existing objects), bearers of 
truth and falsity, and composed of ideas in themselves (Vorstellungen an sich) (20-21). Ideas 
are in turn either complex (zusammengesetzt), e.g. [prime number] and also [prime], or 
simple (einfach), e.g. [not] (as is customary in Bolzano-scholarship, square brackets indicate 
propositions or ideas). Further, ideas can either refer to one or more objects, or to no object at 
all. Both propositions and ideas Bolzano sharply distinguishes from their corresponding 
mental items, viz. judgements and subjective ideas (in Husserlian terminology, propositions 
and ideas are ideal, not immanent, contents). 
Bolzano understands the distinction between intuitions (Anschauungen) and concepts 
(Begriffe) somewhat different from Kant. An intuition “is defined as a simple idea that has 
exactly one object” (24), e.g., ‘this pen’, and a concept is “(a)ny idea that is not an intuition 
and that does not contain an intuition as a part” (25). The third group, “ideas that aren’t 
intuitions, but contain at least one intuition as a part” (25), Bolzano calls mixed ideas 
(gemischte Vorstellung). Correspondingly, Bolzano distinguishes between intuitional 
propositions, i.e. propositions containing at least one intuition, and conceptual propositions: 
for Bolzano roughly equivalent to a posteriori and a priori truths (26). 
Bolzano holds that all propositions have the form [A has b]; [has] is an objectless idea 
(copula), [A] is a subject-idea and [b] is a predicate-idea. This requires Bolzano to heavily 
paraphrase ordinary propositions, e.g. ‘there are cows’ into [[Cow] has objectuality] and 
‘there are no real square roots of -1’ into [[Real square root of -1] has lack of objectuality]. A 
proposition, [A has b], is then defined by Bolzano as true “just in case A is objectual and all 
objects that fall under [A] have at least one of the properties that fall under [b].” (29) 
Bolzano’s notion of deducibility (Ableitbarkeit) constitutes not only a significant 
improvement compared to his contemporaries’ alternative accounts (19), but is also, with its 
focus on truth-preservation under variation, close to the now standard Tarskian definition 
(43-44). However, it is highly unorthodox in that it is a ternary relation: deducibility holds 
“between a collection of premises, a collection of conclusions and a collection of ideas that 
are considered to be variable.” (45) Thus “Bolzano’s notion validates many arguments that 
are not logically valid on a modern understanding of the notion.” (47) Fortunately, Bolzano 
also has a binary relation of logical deducibility which is close to our modern understanding, 
defined such that the collection of premises Δ is logically deducible from Γ iff Δ is deducible 
from Γ when all non-logical ideas are considered to be variable. It is logical deducibility that 
is important for Bolzano’s theory of grounding (47). Further relevant to grounding, Roski 
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presents a notion of mutual deducibility/equivalence (Gleichgüldigkeit), e.g. as in the 
example of the barometer; and a notion of exact deducibility (genaue Ableitbarkeit) i.e. an 
argument containing no redundant premises or ideas. 
 
Chapter 3. Explanatory priority: Bolzano’s pure logic of grounding 
Roski reconstructs Bolzano’s theory of the pure logic of grounding, i.e. the logical properties 
of grounding independent of its relata. 
Bolzano distinguishes between complete and partial grounds, and between immediate 
and mediate grounds. A partial ground is a part of a complete ground, e.g., the truth of a 
conjunct is a partial ground of the truth of a conjunction. A mediate ground is a ground of an 
immediate ground, e.g., in Euclid’s Elements Post I.1 is a mediate ground of Prop I. 19, while 
Prop I.5 and I.18 are its immediate (complete) ground (64). Bolzano only applies the 
partial/complete distinction to immediate grounds (65), and thus we have a tripartite 
distinction between partial immediate grounds, complete immediate grounds, and mediate 
grounds (and correspondingly for consequences). Bolzano explicitly takes the complete 
immediate ground to be the only genuine case of grounding (66). However, Bolzano-scholars 
disagree on which of the following two cases should be considered basic: Either the relation 
of a complete ground to its complete consequence, or the relation of a complete ground to 
one of its partial consequences. Roski favours the second alternative, thus naming this 
relation ‘grounding’. The first he names ‘complete grounding’. 
Roski first roughly follows Bolzano’s presentation of immediate grounding (WL 
§198-215) in his section 3.4, and then gives a more concise reconstruction in 3.5. In the latter, 
Roski shows that most properties of pure grounding can be derived from three basic 
principles: The asymmetry of partial grounding, the uniqueness of grounding (i.e., there is 
only one complete ground of a consequence), and the existence of fundamental truths (i.e., 
some truths are ungrounded). Both partial grounding and complete grounding are defined in 
terms of the primitive notion of grounding. From this Roski derives, first, the theorem that 
there is no overlap between any complete ground and its complete consequence; second, the 
asymmetry of complete grounding; third and fourth, the irreflexivity of complete grounding 
and partial grounding; fifth, that complete consequences do not overlap; sixth, the uniqueness 
of complete grounds; seventh and eighth, anti-monotonicity of grounding and of complete 
grounding; and, ninth, failure of transitivity and cut. In order to derive the last properties of 
pure ground, two further principles must be supplied, corresponding to what is sometimes 
called Aristotle’s insight (cf. Metaphysics Θ 9, 1051b6-9; and Categories 5, 4b8-10 and 12, 
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14
b
18-22): “Every truth φ and every collection of truths {φ1,...,φn}is the complete ground of a 
truth of the form [φ is true] and [Each proposition in {φ1,...,φn} is true] respectively” (71). 
From this Roski derives, first, the seriality of complete grounding, grounding, and partial 
grounding (i.e., every collection of truths has another collection of truths as its complete 
consequence, every collection of truths is a complete ground of another truth, and every truth 
is a partial ground of another truth); second, linkedness of partial grounds (i.e., there are 
truths φ, θ, ψ such that φ partially grounds θ and θ partially grounds ψ); third, internal 
dependence (i.e., “that truths which form the complete ground of a given truth may 
themselves stand in grounding relations” (97)); and fourth, anti-amalgamation (i.e., pairs of 
complete grounds and consequences cannot be fused). 
The chapter also discusses mediate grounding, showing it to be irreflexive, transitive, 
and asymmetrical (103), and briefly discusses the possibility of infinite grounding trees. 
 
Chapter 4. Simplicity and economy: Bolzano’s impure logic of grounding 
The main source for Bolzano’s impure logic of grounding, where only conceptual truths are 
the relata of impure grounding, is WL §221. In what is by far the longest chapter of the book 
(109-213), Roski gives a very thorough discussion of §221 (most of which I am unable to 
discuss here for reasons of space), including a discussion of some tensions between 
Bolzano’s pure and impure logic. 
The fundamental notion in this chapter is complexity. Grounds are required to be less 
complex than their consequences. Bolzano strictly defines complexity in terms of the number 
of ‘simple parts’ in a proposition, such that a proposition with more simple parts is more 
complex than a proposition with less simple parts. Roski here argues that the relevant parts 
are not the type but rather the token occurrences (e.g. of the simple idea [not]) (115). In 
addition, grounds should avoid redundancy and therefore not contain logically analytic truths 
nor consist of logically dependent propositions. 
Here enters the tension with Bolzano’s pure logic, which says that every truth and 
every collection of truths grounds some other truth. Yet, not every truth satisfies the 
simplicity and economy principles. To resolve this tension, Roski argues that “Bolzano 
should let go of the seriality of grounding, and consequently of (Truthcoll)” (159), where 
‘(Truthcoll)’ is Aristotle’s insight applied to collections of truths. 
 
Chapter 5. Bolzano’s logic of grounding and the logic of metaphysical grounding 
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Roski generally notes much convergence between Bolzano’s and contemporary theories of 
grounding, most strongly for his pure logic of ground. However, Bolzano held pretty much 
the opposite view from the contemporary, regarding ground of quantificational truths (229-
231): He took truths containing an existential quantifier, e.g., ‘there is something’, as basic, 
rather than as grounded in a truth without the existential quantifier; and he took a truth 
containing a universal quantifier as partially grounding one of its instances. 
Further, Roski earlier (10) notes that grounding does not hold among two truths 
because a relation of ontological dependence holds between the objects mentioned in the 
truths. Dependence- or priority-relations has no further explicit role in Roski’s discussion of 
Bolzano, yet they are central to many contemporary theories of grounding (especially to 
Benjamin Schnieder’s work). I would have liked some discussion on this point. 
 
Summary 
The book is written in clear and concise English, and does not presuppose previous 
knowledge of Bolzano. There are some typos, none of which should present any obstacle to 
understanding the text. The logical notation used is introduced and explained, and a list of 
symbols, definitions, and principles is included. However, I must note some shortcomings of 
the index. Preferably, the index should have contained names of other scholars of Bolzano 
discussed in the book. Similarly, some of the entries are incomplete (e.g., a number of 
passages mentioning Aristotle have not been included in the index). Further, the Bolzano-
scholar would, I think, appreciate an index locorum for passages from Bolzano. 
While the book is mainly a scholarly work rather than a theoretical contribution, 
Roski is too modest when he asserts that “the book will not contribute anything new to the 
debate on metaphysical grounding” (2-3). For he later says: “Bolzano did not merely 
anticipate many views that are part and parcel of the current debate. He also went beyond 
them in interesting ways.” (232) The presentation of these ideas can be said to be an addition 
to the debate, even though this still leaves the possible application and defence of these ideas 
as a task for future research. In conclusion, Roski’s book should be of strong interest to 
anyone interested in Bolzano or grounding. 
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